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The impact of local taxes on plants location decision 
Abstract 
Determinants of plant locations are known to be multiple. Locations of partners and 
competitors are crucial, as well as the territory's local characteristics. Some local 
characteristics can be natural. Others, like local taxes, reflect local agents' decisions. 
To what extent are local taxes taken into consideration during the plant location 
process? We build a Poisson model to explain the number of firm creations observed 
in a given municipality in a given year. Correlations and first results tend to show that 
there exists some unobserved attractivity factors correlated with the level of local 
taxes. To deal with endogeneity, we present an approach close to the Regression 
Discontinuity Design. Finally, we find that, everything else being equal, higher local 
taxes actually deter firms from investing in a given zone. 
Keywords: local attractivity, local taxes, plant location decisions, regression 





Fiscalité locale et choix d’implantation  
des nouveaux établissements industriels 
Résumé 
Les déterminants de localisation des établissements sur le territoire sont multiples. La 
localisation des partenaires, des clients, des concurrents ou des éventuels autres 
établissements du même groupe sont d'une importance cruciale, tout comme les 
caractéristiques locales du lieu d'implantation (présence de main d'œuvre, 
d'infrastructure...). Parmi ces multiples facteurs, nous tentons d'isoler l'impact de la 
fiscalité locale (au travers de la taxe professionnelle) sur la probabilité d'implantation 
des établissements industriels de plus de dix salariés. Nous construisons d'abord un 
modèle théorique duquel découle un modèle Poissonien expliquant le nombre 
d'implantations dans une commune pendant une année donnée. Pour tenir compte 
d'éventuels problèmes d'endogénéité résultant d'une part d'une appréhension 
insuffisante des déterminants non fiscaux de l'attractivité des territoires (forces 
d'agglomération, accessibilité et niveau d'infrastructure...) et d'autre part de 
l'interaction entre les différentes collectivités locales, nous introduisons un cadre de 
Régression par Discontinuité, utilisant les frontières de départements et de régions 
pour identifier notre modèle. Nous en déduisons que la taxe professionnelle, si elle ne 
semble pas constituer un élément primordial pour les  entreprises, a tout de même un 
impact significatif sur les décisions d'implantation. 
Mots-clés : attractivité locale, fiscalité locale, décisions d’implantation des entreprises, 
régression par discontinuité, régression de Poisson, économie spatiale 
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31 Introduction
1.1 General background
Understanding ¯rms' location decisions is a key issue for regional policy and planning. The lit-
erature on this topic mainly emphasizes the role of agglomeration e®ects. Guimar~ aes, Figueirdo,
and Woodward (2003), Crozet, Mayer, and Mucchielli (2004) or Cohen and Paul (2005) seek
to model and estimate these spillover e®ects: ¯rms tend to set up plants in locations where
other plants are already present as they expect positive externalities. Some works, e.g. Baldwin
and Krugman (2004) or Charlot and Paty (2006), even show that local authorities bene¯t from
these situations and raise taxes in locations in which many plants are set up: they call this
phenomenon an agglomeration e®ects' taxable rent.
Facing a geographical, economic, social and ¯nancial situation, a local authority decides on the
tax rate on plant activity and bears its consequences in terms of employment as well as tax
revenues. Setting the right tax rate to reach the right business attractivity is a crucial matter
for most of local authorities. France is divided into 36,600 municipalities1. Each of them is
allowed to choose a speci¯c tax rate that operates directly on a tax base. The 36,600 munici-
palities are grouped into 96 departments, which are themselves subdivisions of 22 regions. Both
departments and regions have the right to raise taxes on the same base as municipalities. These
local authorities constitute the French local executive power which makes decisions according
to the subsidiarity principle: any decision relating to only one level is taken at the appropriate
level. At each level, there potentially exists some competition between the di®erent authorities
as they all generally aim at attracting new plants to their territories (both for employment and
tax revenue reasons). Vertical and horizontal tax competition can be modelled and observed, as
explained in Andersson and Forslid (2003), Madiµ es, Paty, and Rocaboy (2004) or Riou (2006),
and may interact with economic choices of other agents.
To increase its attractivity, a local authority can either cut its tax rate or invest in new infras-
tructure (at least partly, as larger infrastructure, such as highways, is ¯nanced jointly by mu-
nicipalities, departments, regions, and the State). We assume, hereafter, that a given territory
1Hereafter, we use the English term of\municipality"for the French\commune". It is the smallest administra-
tive unit to which some of the State's regalian powers is delegated. Notably, municipalities are allowed to raise
taxes.
5is characterized by an \absolute attractivity" that is re°ected by the average plants' setting-up
process in this territory. See annex A for a formalization on the notion of attractivity.
The goal of this paper is to quantify the impact of local determinants on ¯rms' decision to
set up a new plant and, especially, local taxes. We choose to focus on establishments that are
not entirely dedicated to a very local market, since, in this case, agglomeration spillovers and
local market power are the main determinants of ¯rms' decisions. We restrict our interest to
establishments of moderate or large size (at least 10 employees the year after creation) and we
exclude the retail-trade sector (e.g., supermarkets, bank o±ces...).
In 2004, local taxes on plants and establishments amounted to 9% of government tax income.
Together with taxes on properties and inhabitants, local taxes represent much more than 20%
of the French tax income (social contributions excluded). Their economic e®ect is far from neg-
ligible. Of course, many economists have paid attention to this issue. To our knowledge, Bartik
(1985) is one of the ¯rst attempts to estimate local determinants of plants' location decisions.
In the French case, one should mention Schneider (1997), who gives an overview of the tax on
plants and establishments, concluding that this tax does not play a notable role in ¯rms' location
decisions. Houdebine and Schneider (1997) focus on the issue of municipalities' tax competition,
deriving a model of location choice and its connection to the °exibility of the local tax rate that
could derive from tax competition. Holmes (1998) deals with the e®ects of State policies on
manufacturing ¯rms locations, in the case of the United States. Interestingly, he uses a regres-
sion discontinuity design to solve endogeneity problems. More recently, Duranton, Gobillon, and
Overman (2006) estimate the impact of local taxes on local employment. Their results suggest
that, once geographical heterogeneity is taken into account, taxes have a signi¯cant negative
impact on employment.
1.2 The data used
We use an exhaustive data set of local tax rates on plants from 1993 to 2002, as well as a local
public ¯nances dataset from which we extract the Self-Financing Capacity per Capita 2 (SFC).
The main tax base for the French local taxes on plants and establishments corresponds to the
2The self-¯nancing capacity per capita is de¯ned as the di®erence between revenues (essentially taxes and
subventions) and expenses (including the interests of the current debt) for a given local zone, divided by the
number of its inhabitants.
6value of tangible ¯xed asset. For large establishments, this includes in particular the value of
the machines used in the production process. Thus, the local tax appears as a tax on capital.
The amount of tax paid by a company is bounded by a two-sided mechanism based on the total
value-added of the company:
1. the tax amount must not exceed a ceiling (which is between 3.5 and 4.0% of the value
added); the top-grading rate depends on the holding sales turnover (3.5% for ¯rms whose
turnover is smaller than 21 million e, and 4.0% for a sale turnover larger than 76 million
e net of taxes); this last rate has been standardized to 3.5% since 2006 ; the municipality
tax rate variation is also much more constrained after 2004.
2. since 2001, a threshold of 1.5% (versus 0.35% in 1998) has been ¯xed for the fraction of
tax in the value-added for companies whose sales turnover is larger than 7.6 million e.
The latter boundary is computed with respect to the tax base of the main establishment.
Local authorities may also decide a two-year tax exoneration for a speci¯c new establishment, if
the latter is located in a zone selected by the Government to bene¯t from this kind of measure.
The zones which are selected for this kind of advantage are generally challenged zones (su®ering
either from high unemployment or low investment) where new plants are particularly welcome.
Finally, one should mention the existence of an equalization mechanism aiming at reducing com-
petition between municipalities: if a municipality tax rate is signi¯cantly lower than the national
mean tax rate, then establishments located in that municipality must pay an additional tax to
an equalization fund. The product of the fund is shared according to the tax levels of the local
authorities. Moreover, municipalities are allowed to tax inhabitants and may substitute the tax
on establishments by inhabitant taxes. This possibility is strictly limited to a proportionality
mechanism with respect to past rates.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of tax rates over the 36,600 French municipalities. Its evolution
between 1998 and 2002 stems from the development of municipalities associations3. The law
of July 12th, 1999 allows municipalities to gather and share their tax policies. By way of
compensation, municipalities associations gained higher decision-making power over urban or
rural planning. They bene¯t from increased bargaining power and are more credible actors on
the local political scene.
3Intercommunalit¶ e in French.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Here, the two histograms of 1998 and 2002 look quite similar. The development of municipality
associations, thus, has resulted into a tax transfer rather than into rate cuts. Figure 1.2 shows
the total tax rate that a®ects establishments located at any given spot within the French territory
(after a kernel smoothing).
Figure 3: Smoothed total tax rate
Notes: This ¯gure shows the average total tax rate in a given municipality, smoothed with a 20 km-window kernel.
The total tax rate is the sum of all components of local tax rates: the sum of the municipality, local association,
department and region tax rates. In the legend, tax rates are in percentage points. As indicated in the legend,
the darker the area, the higher the average local tax rate. The fact that some contrast appears in this map can be
interpreted as the evidence that some spatial correlation between local tax rates exists: when the total tax rate
is high in a municipality, it is likely that the total rates in neighboring municipalities are also high.
It shows an interesting pattern: in some areas, such as the Central East of France, tax rates
are very low, whereas in some others, like the Mediterranean coast, tax rates are higher. This
suggests that there is probably a signi¯cant correlation between the nested structures that
contribute to the tax rates applied in a given municipality. Apart from the correlation between
9various tax rates, one can show that the \tax rate" process is spatially stationary around a
deterministic mean. Figure 1.2 shows the kernel estimation of the (isotropic) autocorrelation
function computed according to the methodology of adaptive bandwidth of Silverman (1986).
Figure 4: Sum of the municipality and community tax rates: observed rate autocorrelation
(straight line) and estimated autocorrelation (dotted line) R(~ ¿) according to footnote 4 formula






















































































































Since the mean diameter of a municipality equals 4.4 km, one can, therefore, say that the local
tax rate adopted by a municipality is, on average, correlated with the tax rates of the closest
neighbors.
Beside these local data on tax rates, we use individual information on plants and ¯rms from the
\SIREN ¯rms directory" database, available at INSEE, and the DADS (\D¶ eclarations annuelles
de donn¶ ees sociales"). The ¯rst database is the o±cial register of French ¯rms and ¯rm-owned
plants. For each plant, it provides its national identi¯cation number (SIREN number) and loca-
tion municipality, as well as its creation date. The DADS are administrative declarations used to
4Estimating a model for the autocorrelation function leads to the following form, with ±0 the Dirac delta-
function and r the radius of the isotropic function in kilometers.






+ 0:041 £ 1(r 2 [0;50]) ¡ 4:5 10
¡4(r ¡ 12) £ 1(r 2 [12;50])
We consider that the autocorrelation is negligible when R(¿) < 0:05. Given our estimation, this is true for
jj¿jj > 6:3km.
10record workers' pension rights. database was developed to ease the collection of labor taxes. It
contains information on employees: their wages, the plants they belong to and the yearly num-
bers of working hours. This database makes it possible to accurately compute a yearly full-time
equivalent number of employees per establishment. The stock of establishments located in a
given municipality is published by INSEE, as well as the number of establishments created each
year between 1993 and 2002. Among all the created establishments, we select those whose size
expressed in terms of the number of employees is larger than 10 one year after their creation. We
keep several activity sectors in our sample (see annex B). The selected sectors account for 45 %
of total unemployment in France in 2000. Holmes and Stevens (2004) underline that the plant
size is an important characteristic to understand which determinants drive location decision.
As our limit at 10 employees may seem ad hoc, we test the robustness of our results, changing
the limit from 10 to 5 employees. For activity sectors and plant size, we run some sensitivity
analyses (see below).
We apply the same sector-size selection to the plant stock than to plant creations. We are
provided with data for annual stocks between 1992 and 2002. Figure 1.2 shows a smoothed
spatial repartition of the establishment stock in 2001 and the establishment creations for the
year 2002. The dominant e®ect is agglomeration as, at ¯rst sight, the distributions of the stock
and the creations look similar. The common pattern is the same: at a national scale, both
distributions re°ect some intrinsic attractivity.
2 Theoretical framework
In this paper, attractivity is de¯ned as the capacity of some spot on the territory to attract plant
creations5. Attractivity is assumed to be split up into two parts. First, a ¯rm broadly decides
on some large area where a new plant is to be settled. This ¯rst choice depends on strategic
factors, i.e. the locations of their suppliers, partners and customers and those of existing plants,
repositories, o±ces belonging to the same ¯rm or the same group. We consider this ¯rst stage as
a long-range one and decide not to focus on this side of the problem. Once the area is broadly
selected, local characteristics may play a role to determine where, exactly, the plant will be
set up. At this second stage, taxes are likely to be taken into account by ¯rms as well as local
5Other de¯nitions of attractivity include attractivity towards workers, investments, or even inhabitants. Our
measure is related to the direct count of new plants setting-up.
11Figure 5: Spatial intensity of the stock of establishments in 2001 (left); Spatial intensity of
newly created establishments in 2002 (right) larger than 10 employees the year after creation
infrastructure or other determinants of local attractiveness. This paper aims at identifying these
second-stage determinants, and focuses on the relevance of taxes.
This section presents a model describing the way ¯rms decide to locate a new plant. This leads
to introduce a spatial intensity characterizing the spatial distribution of ¯rm locations and the
probability for a new plant to be located at some point in space.
Let i 2 E refer to a ¯rm willing to set up a new plant in an Euclidean space F ½ R2. Firm i
and its associated to-be-created plant have some intrinsic characteristics (e.g., plant size, group
size, nationality... ) expected to induce speci¯c behaviors. For this reason, we split the total set
of ¯rms E into homogenous subsets fEmgfm=1:::Mg.
For strategic reasons (which could be the proximity of providers or customers or other plants of
the same group or the existence of a pool of skilled workers), ¯rm i selects an ideal spot s¤
i 2 F
for the new plant. However, this strategically ideal spot may not be the best for the ¯rm as
other location-dependent factors Z (for example local taxes) may in°uence the ¯nal decision.
We call Um(s¤
i;s) the utility of a ¯rm i 2 Em to settle on a spot s when its strategically ideal
spot is s¤





12d(a;b), with (a;b) 2 F2, is the Euclidian distance between spots a and b, hm(z1;z2) is the aggre-
gating function of spatial factors z1 and z2 and u is an aggregating utility function. hm(z1;z2)
may depend on which partition Em the ¯rm i belongs to. More informally, this utility function
can be seen as a way to weigh two criteria: going further from the ideal point s¤
i is a loss that
must be compensated by a gain of choosing a spot with better factors Z. Weights on these
criteria are allowed to be heterogenous across the partitions m = 1:::M.
Therefore, location ~ si that ¯rm i will ultimately prefer for its new plant is such that:
Um(s¤
i; ~ si) = max
s Um(s¤
i;s):
We, then, de¯ne an application tU;m : F ! F such that:
tU;m(s¤) = argmax
s Um(s¤;s):
tU;m(s¤) is the maximizing-utility location for a ¯rm belonging to group m and whose strategi-
cally ideal location is s¤. We assume that the fs¤
ig are distributed along a spatial distribution
gm, which may di®er across the partitions of E.
Let A be a subset of F. De¯ning t¡1
U;m(A) = f~ s 2 FjtU;m(~ s) 2 Ag we obtain:







This de¯nes the probability that a ¯rm decides to settle a plant in area A. We assume that this








Thus, assuming that the ¯rst-stage process gm is exogenous but that, at a second stage, ¯rms
trade o® proximity from their ideal point against better local characteristics, there exists an
underlying density 'm of new plants creations (for type-m ¯rms).
Annex C shows how our theoretical framework can be adapted into an estimation framework.
From binomial distributions at each spot, Poisson distributions on areas are derived by applying
the Poisson theorem. Then, the likelihood of the Poisson model is deduced. In the next section,
we investigate the estimation strategies allowed by this framework.
133 Estimation strategies
3.1 Municipal factors and local factors
According to annex C, the probability that n type-m plants are created in area k during period t
is a function of area k's long-range (or strategic) attractivity ¤0
k;m and the intrinsic characteristics
(observable or not) involved in short-range attractivity xk;m. In what follows, the studied areas
Ak are municipalities.















For the sake of simplicity, we remove hereafter the subscript m, assuming that there is only one
type of ¯rm, and subscript t, assuming independence across periods. The relevance of the ¯rst
assumption is analyzed in annex F), where we run di®erent regressions according to plants sizes
and sectors.
The parameter of interest is ¯. The relative relevance of local characteristics in impacting at-
tractivity and average partial e®ects can be derived from it.
We would like to distinguish between the covariates x on the following ground. First, as we
already discussed, distinction has to be made between long-range and short-range covariates.
This was done by separating ¤0 from the exponential part of ¤. Second, among the short-range
covariates, there are some whose e®ect depends on the Euclidean distance from a given spot and
others that correspond to a precise zone, circumscribed by precise administrative boundaries.
For example, the presence of a highway access road belongs to the ¯rst category, as the attrac-
tiveness of such an asset decreases with the distance to it. On the other hand, municipality
tax rate is a pure municipality variable (a zone variable), as it does not depend on the location
inside the municipality but rather on which municipality the plant is located. We denote by `
(for local) the covariates belonging to the ¯rst category, by m (for municipality) those belonging
to the second one.










To be precise, we assume that x`
kt may contain local investments whose use is not limited only to
the municipality inhabitants (like swimming-pools, parks, etc.). xm
kt may contain local tax rates
as well as local infrastructure whose use is limited to the municipality inhabitants (like primary
schools, municipality libraries, kindergarten, etc.). Among the covariates present in equation
1, some are observed, others are not. Our observed covariates, that we denote ~ x are, to start
with, the tax rates at the region, the department and the municipality levels. All these observed
covariates belong to the m covariates' set.
The ¯rst two estimation strategies are driven from two alternative assumptions.




kt + ~ xkt~ ¯
i
(2)
If we assume that the observed covariates ~ x are orthogonal to the unobserved ones, this
estimation will provide consistent estimates for parameters ~ ¯ relating to the observed
covariates.
2. As this orthogonality condition is strong, we replace it with a time-regularity assumption:
all the unobserved variables are assumed to be captured by a time-invariant ¯xed e®ect




kt + ~ xkt~ ¯ + "k
i
(3)
Speci¯cation (3) relies on the assumption that unobserved determinants are more sluggish than
tax rates, or are decorrelated from them. For the municipality tax rate, it is a very strong as-
sumption, for at least two reasons. First, municipalities can modify the tax rate to o®set either
attractivity gains or losses due to other factors. Second, tax competition between municipalities
is very likely to occur and di±cult to detect, as is shown in Houdebine and Schneider (1997).
Therefore, the municipality tax rate is very likely to su®er from endogeneity problems. In the
speci¯cations presented in the next section, we separate the municipality rate from the other
6This model is sometimes denoted Fixed-E®ect Poisson model, as in Wooldridge (2002). A seminal work on
this model is Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). Let us also mention more recent works such as Blundell,
Gri±th, and Windmeijer (1997) and Cr¶ epon and Duguet (1997).
15(department and region) rates to take these potential problems into account.
¸0 can either be dropped or explicitly taken into consideration. In speci¯cation (3), one can
assume that ¸0 is sluggish and can be caught by the ¯xed e®ects. In speci¯cation (2), omitting
a proxy variable is even more problematic as it leads to implicitly assuming that there is no
signi¯cant spatial pattern for long range e®ects: two spots where the observed variables are
equal are, thus, assumed to have equal attractivity. One way to remedy this is to introduce a
variable to proxy long range attractivity. Let z denote this proxy variable and ° its associated
parameter. In some speci¯cations, we chose to introduce the lagged plant stock in the given
municipality in this purpose.




zkt° + ~ xkt~ ¯
i
or ¤kt = exp
h
zkt° + ~ xkt~ ¯ + "k
i
:
whether ¯xed-e®ects are introduced or not.
The assumptions that are necessary to obtain unbiased estimations of our parameters of interest
are very strong, and one can doubt their validity. In the next section, we propose another
framework correcting most of the endogeneity problems as well as taking the uncertainty about
long-range attractivity into account.
3.2 A regression discontinuity design
Administrative boundaries are appealing discontinuities to try to disentangle local e®ects from
zone e®ects (as we named them in the former subsection). The framework presented in this
subsection is close to the regression discontinuity design7. Considering a boundary j separating
two departments, we build a sample of municipalities belonging to a narrow ribbon Sj around
boundary j. The ribbons and all the concerned municipalities are computed using a Geographic
Information System (GIS | Map Info) and a geographic database (Route 500 from Institut
G¶ eographique National) where all the administrative contours of regions, departments and mu-
nicipalities are given. Figure 3.2 illustrates the construction of the ribbons8, for the Parisian
7Black (1999) is an application of the regression discontinuity design to estimate parents' valuation of ele-
mentary education quality. The regression discontinuity design has, then, been formalized in Hahn, Todd, and
Van der Klaauw (2001).
16region. As will be shown, subsampling this way allows us to get rid of both long-range and
short-range attractivity determinants. Only remains the municipality-zone component.
Figure 6: Ribbon selection: Example of a 1km width bu®er computed around the
department boundaries of the Parisian region and the subsequent selection of municipalities
which intersect the bu®er
Let us consider the decision of a ¯rm i to locate its new plant in municipality k, which is itself
located on one side of the boundary j or the other (but always on the ribbon Sj). We can model
this decision through a binary variable Zijt which takes value 1 if plant i chooses to set up in
a municipality situated on the side where the sum of department and region tax rates are the
lowest and 0 otherwise.
8Around each boundary j, we build a narrow bu®er of width 1km (thus 500m inside each department). When
the bu®er intersects a municipality, the municipality is selected in the ribbon Sj. When the intersection of the
1km-width bu®er and a municipality is null, then this municipality is not selected in the subsample.








ijt) = 1 ¡ ©(Xd
ijt¯)
where ©(:) is the chosen cumulative distribution function (we will use the logistic function in
most regressions). The dependent variable is the Zijt binary variable. Among the regressors
Xd
ijt, the variable corresponding to the department and region tax rate (the sum of department
rate and region rate) is built in a way that allows the possibility of a non linear dependency of
the dependent variable with respect to local taxes. Let ¢DRTjt denote the gap between the
department and region tax rates over the two sides of boundary j. We build ¢DRTjt so that it
is always positive. A set of four dummies (±k



























1 if ¢DRTjt > Q75%
0 otherwise
where the values of the Q® correspond to the quartiles of the empirical distribution of (¢DRTjt)j;t.
Table 3.2 shows the values of the Q® as well as some additional statistics relating to the sample
of observations used in the RD framework.
Annex D details the complete set of assumptions used to identify the e®ect of the department
and region tax rate di®erences on the decision taken by the ¯rm.
The other covariates of the logistic regression require more attention. In order to identify the
parameters of interest (i.e. the coe±cients of the ± dummies), one has to control for infra-
departmental properties. Notably, municipality tax rates have to be controlled for. It is possible
that municipalities experiencing a higher department rate might try to o®set it by cutting their
own rates. We also include the presence of an activity zone in the municipality where the plant
is settled. An acceptable RD estimate has to deal with this issue. Formally, let Aij be some
variable characterizing the municipality situated in ribbons j where the plant i actually settles.
18Table 1: Some statistics about the sample used in the RD framework
Variables Values
number of municipalities 7,408
number of municipalities where there is at least one creation
over the sample period
2,904
number of creations in 1993 646
number of creations in 1994 571
number of creations in 1995 539
number of creations in 1996 610
number of creations in 1997 558
number of creations in 1998 575
number of creations in 1999 624
number of creations in 2000 672
number of creations in 2001 647




19Here, Aij may be a continuous (like municipality tax rate) or a binary (like the existence of an
activity zone) variable. Aij cannot be directly introduced in the regression as the municipality
considered on each side of the boundary j (that is, whether Z = 0 or Z = 1) is not the same.
Thus, we try three competing speci¯cations for introducing Aij in the regression. We denote ¹ A
the average value of Aij over the municipalities belonging to all ribbons.
1. The ¯rst way consists in introducing Zij(Aij ¡ ¹ A) and (1 ¡ Zij)(Aij ¡ ¹ A) in the set of
covariates.
2. The second way requires the computation of Aij's averages on each side of every ribbon.
Then, instead of computing the di®erence between Aij and ¹ A, we compare Aij to a proxy
of its counterfactual: the average level of A on the opposite side of the same ribbon Sj.
3. The third way consists in computing Zij(Aij ¡ ~ Aij) and (1 ¡ Zij)(Aij ¡ ~ Aij) where ~ Aij is
a counterfactual of Aij, measured in the closest municipality located on the other side of
ribbon Sj. Thus, the probabilistic model of the ¯rm decision speci¯es that the plant might
be located on one side or the other of the boundary j in a neighborhood containing two
municipalities: the one actually chosen and an alternative located on the other side of the
ribbon.
4 Applications
We apply the models presented in the previous sections to explain the attractivity of French
municipalities by our chosen covariates9. We measure the number of plants created in each
municipality and we explain this number by local taxes on economic activity and Self-¯nancing
capacity per capita (SFC). We assume that SFC is a proxy of the quality of the local ¯nances
management. In addition to this, we have to control for the impact of local attractivity indepen-
dently from local taxes. There might be some endogenous adaptation of local taxes to correct
a low attractivity level or, on the contrary, to bene¯t from high attractivity. We, therefore,
introduce some explanatory variables that describe the local level of infrastructure, such as the
existence of a primary school, a nursery, a library or a swimming pool. We also introduce some
variables that describe the connection of municipalities to the national road network. Table 4
9Most of our computations, maps, correlations, estimations were performed using the software R, and its
contributed packages maps, spdep, RArcInfo and stats4. See R Development Core Team (2005), Becker, Wilks,
Brownrigg, and Minka (2005), and G¶ omez-Rubio (2005). Ribbon selection was carried out using MapInfo, and
some regressions were computed with SAS and Stata.
20provides some summary statistics for the main covariates.
Table 2: Some statistics about the regression variables
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Notes: Q® is the ® quantile of the plant creation or plant stock distributions; the quartiles on the
left hand-side table refer to the 1993-2002 distribution for tax rates and to the year 2000 for SFC. These
quartiles refer to municipalities where the stock of plants is greater than 0. Paris is excluded from the
statistics.
We recall the intuition behind our theoretical model. A ¯rm willing to settle a new plant will,
¯rst, take into account several factors such as the locations of economic partners (suppliers or
customers) or the locations of other plants belonging to the same ¯rm. This is a ¯rst stage
that we want to purge out. After having selected a wide area, the ¯rm takes local character-
istics into consideration in order to choose in which municipality in particular the plant will
be established. We concentrate our analysis on this second stage. In other words, we focus on
local attractivity at the scale of municipalities, assuming that the main impact of local taxes is
local. We, also, assume that companies make their decisions upon some inter-temporal expec-
tation of their pro¯ts, taking the ability of local authorities to manage local ¯nances into account.
We propose two methods to estimate our key parameter: the coe±cient on departement and
region tax rate. A ¯rst way is to run the spatial regression, detailed in subsection 3.1. These
regressions are presented in section 4.1.
A second approach is based on a regression discontinuity design, explained in subsection 3.2.
Using the fact that, on both sides of a department boundary, the tax levels di®er but the local
attractivity is similar, we can identify the impact of taxes on ¯rm behavior. These regressions
are presented in section 4.2.
214.1 Spatial regression
According to the scheme presented in section 3.1, we compute the following set of regressions:
Nkt » P[exp(zkt° + ~ xkt~ ¯)]
where Nkt is the number of plants created in municipality k during year t, while ~ xkt are the
covariates described in table 4.1 and zkt is the proxy for global attractivity. In addition to
these, time-dummies and dummies corresponding to the municipality infrastructure inventory
are introduced (cf. annex E). We observe the number of plant creations during each year between
1993 and 2002 in each French municipality. Therefore, the number of observations amounts to
36;600 £ 10 = 360;000 for each regression. Some observations are lost as some explanatory
variables are not available in every municipality for the whole period. However, we checked that
none of the municipalities where a plant creation occurred between 1993 and 2002 had been
removed.
Table 3: Spatial Poisson regression
Covariates Estimates - Panel 1993-2002















































1993-2002 year dummies - - yes yes yes
Stock (T-1)1 - - - 1 -
Municipal infrastructure inventory - - - - cf. annex E
Nobs 365,679 365,430 365,430 117,113 361,567
Notes: 1 star means 95%-signi¯cant and 2 stars mean 99%-signi¯cant. Standard errors are in parentheses.
(
1) the stock variable is transformed into a Poisson intensity such that, if the distribution of new creations were
the same as the one leading to the actual stock, all the other regression coe±cients should be equal to zero. Its
coe±cient is constrained to be one.
22The ¯rst three regressions are free from any attempt of controlling for\absolute attractivity". It
is highly probable that, since some variables are omitted, the regression coe±cients are biased.
For example, one can think that, if a municipality is more attractive everything else being equal,
there should be a positive correlation between its tax rate and the residual (that includes the
extra-attractivity component), since this municipality can attract new plants even if its tax rate
(thus its revenue) is high. Therefore, even if the tax dependency of new plant creations should
be negative, the previous endogeneity might lead to an apparent positive dependency. It is
precisely what we observe in the ¯rst three regressions.
In the last two regressions, we attempt to control for absolute attractivity. First, in regression
(4), we choose the lagged stock of plants as a proxy for absolute attractivity. Then, in regression
(5), we include some explanatory variables relating to the level of local infrastructure in the con-
sidered municipality (cf. annex E). In this last regression, the municipality tax rate coe±cient is
signi¯cantly lower than when the absolute attractivity is not controlled for, but it is still positive.
In addition to tax variables, we have also introduced the SFC as a proxy for local public ¯nances
health. This variable, together with the tax rates, should be understood as a signal for plants
of the stability of the future tax level: if the SFC is low, an economic shock is more di±cult to
absorb without increasing the taxes than if the SFC is high. This analysis is consistent with the
estimated coe±cients.
The results, however, suggest that there still exist some endogeneity. In fact, the coe±cients
associated with the municipality tax rate are positive. Therefore, the omitted variable of absolute
attractivity may not be satisfactorily captured by the proxy variables. Hence, we need to
improve the treatment of this endogeneity. A ¯rst approach consists in using the panel approach
supposing that the probability of new plant creation is associated with a ¯xed e®ect removed
by time-di®erentiation. Unfortunately, we cannot present the results for this approach as there
are not enough remaining degrees of freedom to allow any inference. Another more convincing
way to deal with the question is to use the regression discontinuity design (section 4.2).
4.2 Regression discontinuity
We adopt the framework explained in subsection 3.2. The regression is of logistic type, repro-
ducing the binary decision taken by ¯rm i to locate its new establishment on one side or the
23other of the boundary j. The observations are available for the whole period between 1993 and
2002 (index t).
Table 4.2 presents the estimation results. There are three columns, standing for the three
methods used to build a counterfactual for each explanatory variable.
1. Regression (1) compares the observed value of the covariate in the considered municipality
to its average in all municipalities present in the sample.
2. Regression (2) compares the observed value of the covariate in the considered municipality
to its average level on the opposite side of the same ribbon.
3. Regression (3) compares the observed value of the covariate in the considered municipality
to its level in the closest municipality on other side of the ribbon.
Note that the areas of the two Parisian airports (Roissy and Orly), as well as Cergy-Pontoise10
were removed from the regressions, due to their strong speci¯city.
Each of the chosen speci¯cations provides clear evidence for this fact: everything else being equal
(especially the municipality tax rate), the level of tax rate applied on one side of the boundary
with respect to the other side has the expected e®ect on ¯rms' decisions. The probability of
locating a new plant in the lower tax side is higher than the probability of locating it on the
other side, everything else being equal. The relationship between the size of the tax gap and the
probability for the ¯rm to choose the lower tax side of the ribbon looks ambiguous. How can our
estimates be interpreted? If we consider that the parameter of interest is around 0:3, the proba-
bility of locating the new plant on the lowest tax rate side is about exp(0:3)=(1+exp(0:3)) ¼ 57%
if all the other covariates are around their average values.
In annex F, we relax some of the hypotheses we have made so far. Our results still hold.
10Roissy and Orly belong to an area where urbanism rules are strictly constrained (through a mechanism
called \proc¶ edure d'agr¶ ement" | agreement process | which is speci¯c to the area around Paris). Cergy-
Pontoise belongs to a speci¯c category named \Ville Nouvelle" (New City) where urbanism rules are also heavily
constrained.
24Table 4: RD logistic regression










































Nobs 6,006 6,006 6,006
N(Z=1) 3,239 3,239 3,239
N(Z=0) 2,767 2,767 2,767
Percentage concordant 99.7 88.3 72.3
Notes: 1 star means 95%-signi¯cant and 2 stars mean 99%-signi¯cant. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The \di®"s stand for the di®erence of the values taken by the considered variable on both sides of the boundary.
For example, [Di® activity zone] takes its value in the set f¡1;0;1g. 1 corresponds to the situation where there
is an activity zone on the lowest tax rate side; 0 corresponds to the situation where there is no activity zone or
an activity zone on both sides; ¡1 corresponds to the situation where there is an activity zone on the highest tax
rate side.
255 Conclusion
Direct spatial Poisson regressions provide us with elasticities of plant creations to the tax rate.
However, these results may be biased due to untreated endogeneity. The best way to deal with
this issue seems to adopt a framework close to Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). First,
we distinguish the total local tax rate into two main components. The ¯rst is the municipality
tax rate. For many reasons, the municipality tax rate cannot be considered as exogenous and,
therefore, observing the elasticity of creations to this rate will lead to biased estimates. The
second is the sum of department and region tax rates. The main source for potential endogene-
ity is the existence of an unobserved spatial determinant for attractivity that may be correlated
to the observed tax rates. Assuming the continuity of such an unobserved determinant and
observing the discontinuity of tax rates at the boundaries of departments and regions, we build
RDD estimates of the impact of taxes on plants' location. A crucial point is to control for the
municipality tax rate (which is also discontinuous). Our RDD logistic regressions con¯rm that
local taxes do have a signi¯cant impact on the probability of a ¯rm to create a plant in a given
municipality, everything else being equal.
Giving sense to this coe±cient is uneasy. One should not infer from our results that the best
¯scal policy for a municipality is to\race to the bottom", that is, to in¯nitely cut taxes. On the
contrary, local authorities must ¯nd an equilibrium between tax revenues and infrastructure.
We do not argue whether this equilibrium has to be \high-tax high-infrastructure" or \low-tax
low-infrastructure". What we actually measure is the extent to which, all infrastructure and
agglomeration e®ects being equal, changing the tax rate in a given zone a®ects plants' creation
in this zone.
In addition, our study might provide a few insights about ¯scal zoning policies11. Typically,
the cost of such a policy is not carried by the municipality, so that lower taxes would not bring
about lower investment in infrastructure. Our study concludes that zoning policies may have a
signi¯cant and positive e®ect on plants' creation. However, this e®ect is likely to be local: plants
created in a low-tax zone would have been created nearby (but maybe not in the low-tax zone)
even without a zoning policy. If one believes in our model, this type of policy mainly improves
11Many zoning policies have been carried out over the last years in France: \Zones Franches Urbaines" (ZFU),
\Zones Urbaines Sensibles" (ZUS)... They all aim at fostering plant creations in challenged infra-municipality
areas by lowering tax rates { or even exempting newly created plants from taxes.
26the attractivity of the zones whose tax rates are lowered to the detriment of those whose tax
rates are maintained unchanged. This analysis deserves to be developed in an explicit evaluation
of these ¯scal zoning policies.
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30A Formalization on attractivity
The notion of attractivity can be formalized as follows. New plants' location decision is based
on an intensity function p(x;t) where x is a point of the geographical space and t denotes time.
This function is assumed to be Lebesgue-measurable such that p 2 L2(R2£R) (L2(R2£R) being




t2I p(x;t)dxdt is the probability
that a ¯rm that aims at establishing a new plant during the time interval I decides to chose to





g(x;t)e¡i!tdt = 0 8j!j < !0 8x
ZZ
g(x;t)e¡i­xdx = 0 8j­j < ­0 8t
where i2 = ¡1. In other words, the space-time variability associated to function g vanishes
for both time and spatial wavelengths independently. There exist both time (h) and space (H)




p(x;t ¡ u)h(u)du = p0(x)
ZZ
p(x ¡ s;t)H(s)ds = p0(x)
p0 is the \absolute attractivity" of point x. The existence of p0 is equivalent to assume that
the process of new plant creation is time-stationary and, except from a deterministic mean, also
spatially stationary. According to Cressie (1993, Eq. 3.1.2.), p0(x) is the large scale variation of
absolute attractivity and g(x;t) is the sum of the small scale variation, the micro-scale variation
and the measurement error of absolute attractivity. p0(x) might be understood either as a spatial
or a temporal average of the location process of new establishments. It is, therefore, possible to
imagine a spatial average of the process that would correspond to the spatial long wavelengths
of the location process. With respect to these long spatial wavelengths, the short ones would
correspond to the local attractivity over which local authorities can have some control.
B Selected industries
The activity sectors selected in our study are the following. Manufacture of food products
and beverages - Manufacture of tobacco products - Preparation and spinning of textile ¯bres -
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur - Tanning and dressing of leather;
manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear - Manufacture of wood and
of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting
31materials - Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products - Publishing, printing and repro-
duction of recorded media - Manufacture of coke, re¯ned petroleum products and nuclear fuel -
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products - Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
- Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products - Manufacture of basic metals - Manufac-
ture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment - Manufacture of machinery
and equipment n.e.c. - Manufacture of o±ce machinery and computers - Manufacture of elec-
trical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. - Manufacture of radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus - Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches
and clocks - Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers - Manufacture of other
transport equipment - Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. - Recycling - Electricity,
gas, steam and hot water supply - Collection, puri¯cation and distribution of water - Construc-
tion - Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles - Land
transport; transport via pipelines - Water transport - Air transport - Supporting and auxiliary
transport activities; activities of travel agencies - Post and telecommunications - Computer and
related activities - Research and development - Other business activities - Sewage and refuse
disposal, sanitation and similar activities.
C Probabilistic framework
The model presented here owes to Best, Ickstadt, and Wolpert (2000) and Best, Ickstadt,
Wolpert, and Briggs (2000). First, we justify the connection between binomial and Poisson
distributions. Second, we derive the natural framework for a Poisson regression on covariates
which represent both establishments and municipalities' characteristics.
C.1 From binomial to Poisson distributions
We keep the notations introduced in sections 2 and 3.1. Let ¹m be the total number of type m
establishments setting up in the spatial set F and Nm(Ak) the number of the latter establish-
ments setting up in area Ak, where k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Nm(Ak) follows a binomial distribution of
parameter pk;m =
R
Ak 'm(u)du and, for n 2 N+,
PfNm(Ak) = ng = Cn
¹mpn
k;m(1 ¡ pk;m)¹m¡n
We assume that the set of the K areas Ak is a partition of F and that the size of each area is
small. More precisely, we assume that we are in the conditions requested to apply the Poisson
32theorem (Papoulis and Pillai, 2002):
when ¹m ! 1; pk;m ! 0 such as ¹mpk;m ! ¤k;m then:
Cn
¹mpn
k;m(1 ¡ pk;m)¹m¡n ! e¡¤k;m (¤k;m)n
n!
It follows that Nm(Ak) converges in distribution to Poisson(¤k;m) where ¤k;m » ¹m
R
Ak 'm(s)ds
when ¹m ! 1 and pk;m ! 0. We set:
¹m'm(s) = ¸m(s)
C.2 Deriving the likelihood of the Poisson model
We assume that, for a given area Ak, the probability distribution of creations is of Poisson type
whose intensity ¸m(s) depends on the considered spot s in space and on the plant type. Thus,


















We assume that the intensity of the Poisson distribution is written:
8s 2 F ; ¸m(s) = ¸0
m(s):exp[xm(s):¯] (4)
where ¯ is an unknown vector of parameters to be estimated through maximum likelihood and
xm(s) is a set of covariates depending on the spot s and on the type m of the considered plant.
¸0
m is an a priori Poisson intensity. Vector ¯ characterizes the relationship between the spatial
intensity and the covariates xm.
To be consistent with section 3.1, ¸0
m is assumed to be constant over any area Ak, as well as the
covariates xm. Thus, ¸m is constant over Ak. This allows us to lighten the notations: xm(sjs 2
Ak) = xk;m, ¸0








k;mSk, ¤k;m = ¤m(Ak),
















The contribution of the area k to the likelihood is similar to the one obtained by Best, Ickstadt,






¡ log(Nk;m!) ¡ ¤0
k;m:exp[xk;m:¯]
Thus,
Lk;m = Cte + Nk;m:xk;m:¯ ¡ ¤0
k;m:exp[xk;m:¯] (6)
If we assume that the number of establishment creations of type m in area k is independent
from the number of creations in a neighboring area (i.e. spatial independence) or the number
of creations of type m0 6= m (i.e. plant type independence), then the likelihood is simply the
sum of the Lk;m (from equation (6)) for k 2 f1:::;Kg and m 2 f1;:::;Mg. The assumption
of independence, and notably the spatial independence, may seem strong at ¯rst glance, since
agglomeration e®ects play a huge role in the establishment creation process. This makes crucial
our assuming an exogenous ¤0
k;m: after purging out from this deterministic spatial attractivity
pattern, it is more acceptable to assume independence of creations across municipalities. At-
tempts to relax the assumption of spatial exogeneity for ¤0
k;m are appealing as they result in
estimating this spatial trend as well. However, they end up discarding the independence hy-
pothesis and the easy-to-do maximum likelihood estimation and adopting simulation approaches
(notably, those based on Monte Carlo Markov Chains).
D More about Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design
A department boundary separates two departments and is practically identi¯ed from the couple
of departments involved. We index the set of boundaries on N. Let us ¯rst consider the boundary
j. We de¯ne an in¯nitely thin bu®er of land Bj around boundary j. Municipalities of interest are
those intersecting this bu®er Bj: we restrict our attention to those contiguous with department
boundaries (see ¯gure D).
Let us now consider a municipality k | whose territory is denoted hereafter Mk | intersected
by the bu®er Bj. A municipality is said to belong to municipality k's neighborhood, denoted
Skj, if this municipality is k itself, or if it ful¯lls the three following conditions (see ¯gure D):
34Figure 7: Regression discontinuity framework: an in¯nitely thin bu®er Bj is de¯ned
around a boundary j that separates two departments; this bu®er intersects some municipalities
on both sides of the boundary; considering municipality k, a neighborhood Skj of municipality
k is de¯ned as the set containing municipality k and all municipalities i) intersecting Bj, ii)
located on the other side of the boundary and iii) contiguous to municipality k (case presented
here); dots are municipality centroids.
35(i) to intersect bu®er Bj;
(ii) to be located on the other side of the boundary (with respect to municipality k);
(iii) to be close to municipality k (in a sense to be precised).
There are various possible choices for condition (iii). One possibility is to take all the munic-
ipalities de¯ned by (i) and (ii). Another possible choice consists in selecting only the closest
municipality to k verifying (i) and (ii). Another one is to select the municipalities that are
contiguous with municipality k, just like in ¯gure (D).
We now consider a plant i located in municipality k. We assume that plant i's location decision
was taken according to an objective function Yij(s) de¯ned over the geographical space and
maximized at the actual location si spot for plant i. Thus:
8s 2 Skj ; Yij(si) > Yij(s)
Finally, we assume the following form for the objective function:
8s 2 Skj ; Yij(s) = ~ ¹ + °¿ij(s) + ~ ´ij(s) (7)
where ¿ is the sum of regional and departmental tax rates, ~ ¹ is a constant and ~ ´ij is an unob-
served variable that is continuous with respect to the geographical space (i.e. limkt¡sk!0 ~ ´ij(t)
exists and equals ~ ´ij(s)). No additional hypothesis is made at this stage on the unobserved
variable ~ ´ij except from spatial continuity. ~ ´ij thus summarizes all the continuous variables that
play a role in the value taken by Yij (spatial or individual).
In the general case, E(¿ij~ ´ij) 6= 0, then the OLS estimate of ° is not consistent. The Regres-
sion Discontinuity (RD) principle is based upon conditioning the regression with respect to a




Yij (sjs 2 Mk) = ~ ¹ + °¿k + ~ ´ij(s)
Yij (sjs 2 Skj n Mk) = ~ ¹ + °¿0(s) + ~ ´ij(s)
where n denotes the set di®erence, ¿k is the sum of regional and departmental tax rates in
municipality k and ¿0(s) is the regional and departmental tax rate applied in the municipality to
which s belongs to (and which is not municipality k, as we assumed). We, then, build a binary
variable Tij(s) such that: 8
<
:
Tij(s) = 1 if ¿k 6 ¹ ¿0
Tij(s) = 0 if ¿k > ¹ ¿0
36where ¹ ¿0 is the mean of ¿0(s) over the whole set Skj. In other words, if plant i is located in sk
in municipality k, then Tij(sk) = 1 if the regional and departmental tax rate in municipality k
is lower than the one applied in Skj n Mk. Tij(sk) = 0 when the regional and departmental tax
rate in municipality k is higher than in Skj n Mk.
Replacing ¿ij with Tij, and rede¯ning ~ ¹ and ~ ´ij accordingly, we obtain a modi¯ed version of
equation (7):
8s 2 Skj ; Yij(s) = ¹ + ®Tij(s) + ´ij(s) (8)
We focus our attention on parameter ®. In each neighborhood Skj, we assume that ´ij and Tij
are independent12. This does not mean that ´ij and Tij are independent in general; it is enough
that these two variables are independent conditionally to the fact that they are both observed
in the same spatial neighborhood Skj. Thus, the regression of a set of observations made on a
set of neighborhoods S =
S











































By the rule of iterated expectations:
E(Tij(s)´ij(s)js 2 S) = EfE[Tij(s)´ij(s)js 2 Skj]jSkj ½ Sg = E(Tij(s)js 2 S)E(´ij(s)js 2 S)
(9)
Developing the inverse matrix13 we have:
plim ^ ® = ® +
1
var(Tij(s)js 2 S)
[¡E(Tij(s)js 2 S):E(´ij(s)js 2 S) + E(Tij(s)´ij(s)js 2 S)]
and ¯nally, using (9):
plim^ ® = ®:
12Another way to say it is to assume, following Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), that E(´ij(s)js 2 Skj)
is continuous with respect to s. Practically, this means that Skj is su±ciently small to consider that ´ij(sjs 2 Skj)
does not depend on s. This last point does not hold for Tij which jumps from 0 to 1 somewhere in the neighborhood.
Then, by continuity, we have E(´ij(s)Tij(s)js 2 Skj) = E(´ij(s)js 2 Skj)E(Tij(s)js 2 Skj). This last result is

















































37A similar reasoning provides:
plim ^ ¹ = ® + E(´ij(s)js 2 S)
Finally, where does the continuity assumption of E(´ij(s)js 2 S) with respect to space and the
discontinuity assumption of Tij play a role? On the one hand, the discontinuity assumption on














5 is invertible. Since Tij is an
index variable correlated to space, if there was no discontinuity, then E(Tij(s)) would be equal
either to 0 or to 1. In both cases, the matrix would be singular. Precisely, the identi¯cation
of ® relies on the invertibility of the previous matrix. On the other hand, the continuity of ´ij
is the reason for which it can be treated locally as a constant and the very local correlation
between Tij and ´ij vanishes, even if these two variables are correlated through space when they
are considered from a general point of view (i.e. unconditionally to space).
This leads us to another point we want to raise about RD: since a part of the overall tax
rate (which is a sum of regional, departmental and municipal components) is decided by the
municipality, an individual e®ect associated to the chosen municipality k remains in the tax
rate applied to the plant. Unfortunately, this individual e®ect is also discontinuous at the
department boundary, since all the municipalities are contained in only one department. Thus,
the municipality part of the tax cannot be put in the residual since the continuity assumption
of the residual would fail. Our strategy is to control for the municipality tax rate. Including
directly this tax rate as an additional variable in the RD regression makes it possible to identify
the ® coe±cient and all the previous results remain valid. (8) is, then, modi¯ed into the following
model:
8s 2 Skj; Yij(s) = ¹ + ®Tij(s) + À
q X
`=1
z`:1(s 2 M`) + ´ij(s) (10)
where the set of municipalities contained in S is indexed over f1;:::;qg, z` stands for mu-
nicipality `'s tax rate and À is the unknown coe±cient of the municipality tax rate in the




`=1 z`:1(s 2 M`) + ´ij(s). Since we cannot assume anymore that Tij(s) and ´0
ij(s)
are independent conditionally to Skj, ^ ® is likely to be biased.
Note that we do not introduce a boundary-speci¯c ¯xed-e®ect as Black (1999) does for the
following reason: it might be useful to add a ¯xed-e®ect if Tij was not the only discontinuous
38variable at the boundary j and if this additional variable was correlated with Tij and took
di®erent values on average on each boundary. In the present case, we assume that such a
situation does not occur. As it is likely that introducing a boundary ¯xed-e®ect in regressions
would dramatically reduce the amount of information used to identify ®, we decided no to do
so.
Finally, Yij is an unobserved latent variable. What we actually observe are the municipalities
where plants settle. An e±cient model is to consider as the dependent variable a binary variable
Zij(s) corresponding to the decision of the individual ¯rm i to be located on the left hand-side
or on the right hand-side of boundary j, one side being the lowest tax rate side, while the other
is the highest one. This is what is implemented in subsection 4.2.
39E Spatial regressions with municipality equipment inventory
In 1998, a systematic inventory of the various equipment available in each of the 36,600 French
municipalities was undertaken. Some of these variables have been used to characterize the \ab-
solute attractivity" in the spatial regression. Tables E and E below focus on the inventory
variables used in the regression corresponding to column (5) of table 4.1. A municipality has
the possibility to delegate the ¯xation of the corporate municipality tax to some local gather-
ing of municipalities. This is called \Intercommunalit¶ e" in French. The index of the level of
intercommunality adopted in this paper corresponds to the ratio of the municipality revenues
that come from a decision taken at the intercommunality structure level over the total revenue
of the considered municipality. Table E shows the results obtained with a Poisson modeling of
the municipality count of plant setting-up. Table E shows the results obtained with a Negative
binomial regression. One can note the good consistency of the two regression results, even if
the sign of the municipality tax rate is negative in the negative-binomial regression, while it is
positive in the Poisson regression. This suggests a certain amount of uncertainty in the deter-
mination of the corresponding parameter. We consider this as another evidence of the weakness
of the Poisson/Negative binomial spatial regression in the estimation of this parameter.
40Table 5: Poisson regression of the municipality count of plant setting-up
Parameter Estimate Std Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -5.3725 0.0485 <.0001
Department & Region tax rate -0.0655 0.0033 <.0001
Municipality tax rate 0.0037 0.0013 0.0041
Department & Region SFC 0.5412 0.0219 <.0001
Municipality SFC 0.0595 0.0013 <.0001
Intercommunality index 0.2447 0.0136 <.0001
distance to closest highway (km) -0.0126 0.0004 <.0001
dummy posto±ce 0.3079 0.0301 <.0001
dummy activity zone 1.3441 0.0302 <.0001
dummy public transportation by bus 0.1251 0.0144 <.0001
dummy city public transportation 0.9643 0.0167 <.0001
dummy school restaurant 0.2567 0.0348 <.0001
dummy nursery school 0.5210 0.0290 <.0001
dummy school evening services 0.3316 0.0228 <.0001
dummy gathering of primary schools (regroupement p¶ eda-
gogique)
-0.0101 0.0161 0.5289
dummy secondary school (collµ ege) 0.1284 0.0223 <.0001
dummy upper secondary school (lyc¶ ee) 0.5555 0.0204 <.0001
dummy technical upper secondary school (lyc¶ ee technique) 0.2896 0.0196 <.0001
dummy hospital 0.3538 0.0183 <.0001
dummy athletics equipment 0.4113 0.0185 <.0001
dummy gymnasium 0.4814 0.0277 <.0001
dummy indoor swimming pool 0.5882 0.0180 <.0001
dummy public library 0.0833 0.0258 0.0012
dummy 1993 -0.1388 0.0252 <.0001
dummy 1994 -0.1732 0.0255 <.0001
dummy 1995 -0.2170 0.0258 <.0001
dummy 1996 -0.1266 0.0252 <.0001
dummy 1997 -0.1294 0.0253 <.0001
dummy 1998 -0.1145 0.0252 <.0001
dummy 1999 -0.0015 0.0245 0.9517
dummy 2000 0.1005 0.0239 <.0001
dummy 2001 0.0808 0.0240 0.0008
dummy 2002 0.0000 0.0000 .
41Table 6: Negative binomial regression of the municipality count of plant setting-up
Parameter Estimate Std Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -5.1966 0.0627 <.0001
Department & Region tax rate -0.0530 0.0049 <.0001
Municipality tax rate -0.0085 0.0020 <.0001
Department & Region SFC 0.4337 0.0352 <.0001
Municipality SFC 0.0936 0.0048 <.0001
Intercommunality index 0.2107 0.0211 <.0001
distance to closest highway (km) -0.0153 0.0006 <.0001
dummy posto±ce 0.3022 0.0321 <.0001
dummy activity zone 1.3073 0.0317 <.0001
dummy public transportation by bus 0.1349 0.0202 <.0001
dummy city public transportation 0.9180 0.0219 <.0001
dummy school restaurant 0.2946 0.0376 <.0001
dummy nursery school 0.5409 0.0304 <.0001
dummy school evening services 0.2799 0.0272 <.0001
dummy gathering of primary schools (regroupement p¶ eda-
gogique)
-0.1525 0.0266 <.0001
dummy secondary school (collµ ege) 0.1878 0.0272 <.0001
dummy upper secondary school (lyc¶ ee) 0.5794 0.0331 <.0001
dummy technical upper secondary school (lyc¶ ee technique) 0.2757 0.0316 <.0001
dummy hospital 0.3423 0.0294 <.0001
dummy athletics equipment 0.3654 0.0249 <.0001
dummy gymnasium 0.4944 0.0300 <.0001
dummy indoor swimming pool 0.5601 0.0269 <.0001
dummy public library 0.1150 0.0288 <.0001
dummy 1993 -0.1191 0.0383 0.0019
dummy 1994 -0.1993 0.0385 <.0001
dummy 1995 -0.2183 0.0387 <.0001
dummy 1996 -0.1416 0.0382 0.0002
dummy 1997 -0.1332 0.0382 0.0005
dummy 1998 -0.1366 0.0381 0.0003
dummy 1999 -0.0302 0.0374 0.4200
dummy 2000 0.0412 0.0369 0.2643
dummy 2001 0.0558 0.0370 0.1316
dummy 2002 0.0000 0.0000 .
Dispersion 1.4132 0.0288
42F Sensitivity analysis
All along the estimation phase, we have to make decisions about which hypotheses to retain and
which to discard. In this annex, we analyze the robustness of our results by relaxing several
assumptions. We consider regression (3) in table 4.2 as the benchmark regression.
F.1 Plant size
The bigger the ¯rm, the bigger the e®ects, table F.1 says. However, some e®ects are still observed
on medium plants (from 10 to 50 employees).
Table 7: RD logistic regression depending on the size of ¯rms
Covariates Estimates - Panel 1993-2002









































Nobs 1,245 4,761 6,006
N(Z=1) 710 2,529 3,239
N(Z=0) 535 2,232 2,767
Percentage concordant 71.5 72.7 72.3
Notes: 1 star means 95%-signi¯cant and 2 stars mean 99%-signi¯cant. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The \di®"s stand for the di®erence of the values taken by the considered variable on both sides of the boundary.
F.2 Activity sectors
As showed in table F.2, the e®ects remain stable and signi¯cant once the tax di®erence has
passed a certain threshold. In some sectors (especially construction (F), wholesale trade (G)
and transport and communication (I), for the third category of tax di®erence, related to variable
43±3
jt), signi¯cance is not achieved, probably because of smaller sample sizes. One can remark that
the e®ects can be quite strong, especially for transport and communications (I) and computer,
R&D and business activities (K), which are more capital-intensive sectors.
Table 8: RD logistic regression depending on sectors
Covariates Estimates - Panel 1993-2002













































































Nobs 6,006 1,486 750 865 680 2,059
N(Z=1) 3,239 764 406 456 403 1,111
N(Z=0) 2,767 722 344 409 277 948
Percentage concordant 72.3 75.5 74.6 71.2 72.5 71.1
Notes: 1 star means 95%-signi¯cant and 2 stars mean 99%-signi¯cant. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The \di®"s stand for the di®erence of the values taken by the considered variable on both sides of the boundary.
Sectors are: manufacture (D); construction (F); wholesale trade (G); transport and communication (I); computer,
R&D and business activities (K).
F.3 Without the Parisian region (^ Ile-de-France)
It is often said that the Paris area drives most of plant creations in France. It is partly true,
as only 3,178 creations out of a total of 6,006 in our data are located outside the ^ Ile-de-France
region. However, our results (table F.3) remain quite stable even after excluding the area around
Paris (whatever the \Petite Couronne" | the three departments contiguous to Paris { or the
entire ^ Ile-de-France region).
44Table 9: RD logistic regression depending on location
Covariates Estimates - Panel 1993-2002









































Nobs 6,006 3,628 3,178
N(Z=1) 3,239 1,973 1,705
N(Z=0) 2,767 1,655 1,473
Percentage concordant 72.3 80.8 82.0
Notes: 1 star means 95%-signi¯cant and 2 stars mean 99%-signi¯cant. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The \di®"s stand for the di®erence of the values taken by the considered variable on both sides of the boundary.
45F.4 Other speci¯cations for RD estimations
Adding other covariates or time dummies does not notably alter the results (table F.4). It might
be meaningful to control for facilities available to inhabitants and from which are excluded people
living on the other side of the department boundary. One can think about facilities organized
around schools or children care.
Table 10: RD logistic regression depending on covariates
Covariates Estimates - Panel 1993-2002





















































Di® munic. SFC - 0:042¤¤
(0:005)
- -
Di® dep. SFC - 0:618¤¤
(0:063)
- -
Di® Infrastructure - - - Yes
Time dummies - - Yes -
Nobs 6,006 6,006 6,006 6,005
N(Z=1) 3,239 3,239 3,239 3,238
N(Z=0) 2,767 2,767 2,767 2,767
Percentage concordant 72.3 76.5 72.9 81.3
Notes: 1 star means 95%-signi¯cant and 2 stars mean 99%-signi¯cant. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The \di®"s stand for the di®erence of the values taken by the considered variable on both sides of the boundary.
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